Introduction
The policy making process of the European Union's (EU) Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) is considered intergovernmental (Risse-Kappen 1996, p. 67; Øhrgaard 1997, p. 8; Sjursen 2011) . In this policy process, the member states are expected to be reluctant to move their decision capacity to the European level, and it is widely regarded that there should be no role for supranational institutions. In recent years, however, this understanding has been contested by scholars who argue that there is an increase in engagement of the European Commission in the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) (Dijkstra 2011 , Blauberger and Weiss 2013 , Weiss and Blauberger 2016 . This paper contributes to this literature by examining a policy initiative of the European Commission in the area of CSDP, which is the first supranational legislation in the field of defence and security: the Defence and Security Procurement Directive (2009/81 EC). 1 Two features of the defence procurement practice in Europe make the acceptance of a proposal for the DSDP (or Directive) surprising. First of all, until the acceptance of the Directive, the defence procurement practice was intergovernmental (Britz 2010) . The acquisition of defence material was organized through voluntary, nonbinding agreements such as the Letter of Intent Framework, the OCCAR, and, more recently, the European Defence Agency (EDA) Code of Conduct. Furthermore, defence procurement had been marked by measures of protectionism. Consequently, when the European Commission (Commission) proposed a defence industry strategy, the member states argued that this strategy was premature (Communication 2003) . In response to a Green Paper from the Commission in 2004, the United Kingdom (UK) and France voiced that they saw no need for a Directive. Secondly, central to the issue of defence procurement has been the use of article 346 TFEU. This article stipulates that the member states, on the basis of an essential national security interest, are able to derogate their defence contracts from the Treaty. 2 Member states have made frequent use of this legal measure to take the acquisition of defence goods outside the scope of the Internal Market.
The Directive, eventually accepted in 2009, makes it more difficult to justify the need for the use article 346 in practice (Trybus 2014) and replaces voluntary agreements with a new legally binding framework. Yet in response to the Commission Green Paper in 2004 member states expressed the preference for intergovernmental cooperation. In the years after this consultation, member states moved from not wanting a Directive to accepting the proposal of the Commission, that is, changed their position. This paper clarifies and accounts for the move from intergovernmental cooperation to the acceptance of a supranational legal framework in the field of defence and security, and asks: why did member states change their position on the proposal for a Directive? 3 The acceptance of the proposal for a Directive challenges the understanding of the CSDP as intergovernmental, highlighting that the regulations in the field of defence and security have intervened in an area of core state powers (Genschel and Jachtenfuchs 2013) .
Previous research on the Directive emphasizes the role of the Commission (Weiss 2013 , Muravaska 2014 , using case law to drive member states to accept the Directive in 2009 Weiss 2013, Weiss and Blauberger 2016) . Others have highlighted the role of the French Presidency in the accepting of the Directive (Hoeffler 2011) . Furthermore, several extensive studies have placed the Directive in its legal context (Heuninckx 2015 , Trybus 2014 . Building on these important findings, the main contribution of this paper is the empirical data from four different member states.
The focus on member states is significant as we expect the CSDP policy to be in the hands of member states. By using this data from these member states on the acceptance of the Directive, the paper brings new knowledge to the field.
The four member states studied are the Netherlands, France, Sweden and the UK. These member states are selected because the UK and France openly rejected more involvement for the Commission, and both countries have large defence industries, which makes their view on the Directive significant. Sweden is one of the six largest defence producers in Europe and a signatory to the Letter of Intent Framework (Britz 2010 ). The Dutch defence industry consists mainly of Small and Medium Enterprises (SMEs), dependent on subcontracting, and the acceptance of a Directive would challenge this practice. This paper systematically studies these member states and gives insight in to why these member states decided to accept a policy that challenges their sovereignty. The study clarifies that some member states were well aware of the Commission's initiatives and were at certain stages very much engaged in the process.
The next part of this paper presents a short overview of the creation of the Directive and the responses of the member states. The second part establishes a theoretical framework drawing on two approaches that may account for change in member state position, and the eventual acceptance. In the third part, I examine whether this acceptance was based on cost-benefit calculations. From this perspective, the Directive was expected to enhance the economic position of member states. It is also investigated if member states were led by certain norms, possibly viewed more important than the norm of sovereignty. The fourth and final part discusses the theoretical implications and limitations of these findings, and makes some suggestions as to how the theoretical underpinnings of this analysis might be further strengthened.
The Defence and Security Procurement Directive
Prior to the Directive, the Commission had been very active in promoting further integration of the European defence equipment market (Political Union 1990; Communication 1997 Communication , 2003 Communication , 2005 Communication , 2007 . Already in 1990, the Commission, with the goal to eventually bring defence equipment under the common market principles, proposed the removal of article 346 TFEU (at that time article 223) (Political Union 1990). This initiative was followed by two communications, in 1996 and 1997, in which the Commission expressed the aim to facilitate the development of cooperation in the defence industry sector (Communication 1996 (Communication , 1997 ). An Action Plan accompanied the latter communication which the Commission requested to be discussed by the Council.
Member states were, however, not willing to discuss these proposals and the Council never reviewed the document (Mörth 2003, p. 43; Eisenhut 2009, p. 115 
Moving beyond intergovernmentalism
The move from intergovernmental to supranational integration in the area of defence equipment procurement could be regarded as a case of creeping competences. Previous studies consider that creeping competence in regulatory policy is caused by a functional spill over (Pollack 1994 , Citi 2014 . Differently, this paper argues that there was deliberate action from both the Commission and the member states in this move.
In order to account for European integration more generally, that is, why member states have transferred parts of their sovereignty to the European level, research has focused on explanations based on the explanation that such a move is in the selfinterest of a state (Lange 1993 , Moravcsik 1998 (Cross 2015 , Riddervold 2011 , Sjursen 2002 . This study, therefore, develops and makes use of the understanding of entrapment: that member states were entrapped in accepting the Directive. The use of such an approach allows for the analysis of the acceptance of the Directive based on the idea of member states as norm (rule) followers. Entrapment was then possible as a consequence of previously made commitments in the context of the European integration.
Cost benefit considerations
A rational choice perspective accounts for political action by supposing that actors are rational and seek to maximize their utility (Elster 1986 , Eriksen 2011 . Actors make choices that are in their self-interest, based on calculations of expected costs and benefits (Howlett et al. 2009 ). These costs and benefits can be either economic or social. Furthermore, preferences or self-interest are assumed to remain constant over a period of time. In the context of European integration it is expected that member states will only accept a supranational policy when it is in their self-interest. The DSDP is a supranational legal act that creates an internal market in the area of defence and security procurement; therefore, the focus is here on the economic benefit. Economic benefits
deriving from an open defence equipment market would then be in the self-interest of a member state. market is that the defence contractors benefit from a larger market by economies of scale. Manufacturers are then able to produce quantities at a lower average cost, which increases the supplier's margins. Secondly, on a larger market, free of trade barriers, the increase in competition will reduce product prices. This increase in competition can be expected to be in the interest of all member states studied here. Consequently, both these economic factors are expected to give member states the possibly to make cuts in their defence budgets or sustain the already reduced defence budgets Weiss 2013, p. 1133) .
When applying this approach to this case study, it is important to note that this economic benefit might look different in the four member states studied. The UK,
France, Sweden and the Netherlands all have quite a different market shares in Europe, and the world (Mawdsley 2008) . Similar, but distinct economic benefits are therefore expected to be found in the analysis. Member states are hypothesised to have changed their position because it was in their interest to have a Directive that was expected to lead to lower prices of defence products due to increased competition and economies of scale. In addition, those economic factors were expected to lead to an improved position of the European defence industry on a global level.
Entrapment
To study the change that occurred in the member states' position, a second perspective is also adopted: entrapment. Entrapment or shaming occurs when actors use norm-based arguments to justify a policy. To apply this perspective to this case study, two basic assumptions are adopted. Firstly, the assumption is that actors belong to a community with shared norms. In a community certain norms are existent that members agree upon or have created, and therefore make cooperation possible. When using this perspective, it allows hypothesising that member states changed their positon based on a norm.
Secondly, the perspective assumes that the collective identity of members within this community is not expected to shape or change preferences (Schimmelfennig 2001 , Thomas 2011 Even though actors will conform to what is appropriate in a certain setting, as common norms or previous commitments are a primary concern, they may continue to have different (national) preferences on a policy issue (Thomas 2011, p. 14) .
The collective is therefore seen as a separate part of an actor's identity, which can be used strategically. In institutional settings, actors are able to shame each other into complying with the obligations they have as a community member, because of adherence to what seems appropriate and legitimate in a certain community (March and Olsen 1998, Schimmelfennig 2001, p. 63; Thomas 2011) . Actors can therefore consider to be entrapped into previously made decisions and community norms.
The EU is an international community with certain norms at its core (Schimmelfennig 2001 , Thomas 2011 . From this perspective, it can be expected that member states within the EU will consider the community norms when making collective decisions. Furthermore, in the EU, the internal market has been one of the main drivers for integration and it is expected to be a (legal) norm to be followed by member states. Contravening internal market rules or not acknowledging the competence of the Commission in this policy field would be a high cost. A member in defiance of community norms questions their credibility.
The second assumption states that even though actors concede to the internal market rules, it will not shape their national preferences. Actors will follow community norms, but they might still have a national preference that differs from what is agreed upon in particular setting. In this case study, member states are expected to have changed due to the credibility attached to internal market rules. It is expected that member states acknowledge a cost of contravening this community norm, but continued to dislike the involvement (and increased role for) the Commission.
To consider if there was entrapment at play, the analysis will first establish the framing of the Directive into an internal market issue. Framing, in the analysis, is then not considered to be a separate mechanism, but as a prerequisite for entrapment. To use framing in this way is a means to clarify that the Directive was indeed proposed as an internal market issue. The hypothesis following this perspective is that member states changed their position because it would be a high cost to contravene the internal market rules. In addition, it is expected that member states chose to comply with internal market rules but continued to disapprove of supranational integration in this policy field.
Data and method
The analysis is based on official documents from both the Commission and member example, studies on the implications of the Directive. Or, it might be that these economic benefits were known, but that the significance of these benefits increased during this period of time. Secondly, entrapment can be confirmed by finding that member states did not change their initial reluctance about the involvement for the Commission, but accepted the proposal because of the validity of previous commitments to the internal market. In order to establish such an argument, it is also significant to find if and when the Directive was framed as an internal market policy. If member state officials indicate a sense of obligation to respect internal market rules, it can be assumed that these rules entrapped member states into changing their position. Change based on expected costs and benefits?
The opening up of the EDEM through a Directive could be expected to lead to two economic benefits, namely, an increase in competition and economies of scale. Both these economic effects will then possibly lead to lower prices for defence products. The expected economic benefit for member states would then be lower defence budgets following from cuts in expenses due to lower prices. Not only can these dynamics be expected to lead to more competition and efficiency within Europe, but it would also make the European defence market more competitive on the world market. As far as the legislative competence in the defence and security field is concerned, we do not believe the Commission has, strictly speaking, any competence. This remains within our competence, member states' competence, and we believe the Commission understands that (European Union Committee, p. 28).
In the field of defence and security policy, the Commission has, strictly speaking, no competence as the British minister would have it. The Commission does, however, have competence in the area of the internal market (article 3 and 4 TFEU).
The position of the UK on the Directive changed after the understanding that this was an internal market issue and the Commission had competence: "The big legal issue was whether they had competence. And the legal advice was that they had competence because it is a single market issue" (Interview British official, 20 January 2015) . Officials indicate that the delegation became more active in approaching and advising the Commission on the Directive (Interview British official, 20 January 2015).
The UK tried to resist the proposal for a Directive as long as they could, but it became inevitable once the proposal was put within the internal market and British officials had to deal with the work provided by the Commission (Interview British official, 19 April 2015) . Contravening the rules of the internal market and the legal competence of the Commission in the field would undermine the importance and the credibility of the internal market commitments.
It was not only for the UK but also for other member states that a shift occurred when they became aware and had the confirmation that the Commission had legal competence in the field of defence and security procurement (Interview British official, 20 January 2015). For some member states it was not until after the proposed Directive reached the Council that they requested the Council's legal department to provide a confirmation of the Commission's legal power to propose the extension of internal market rules into the area of defence procurement (Muravska 2014) . The Council confirmed that the Commission had that kind of power.
The credibility attached to placing the DSDP within the internal market is emphasized by a Dutch official, who argues that the ambition of the Commission was to treat the defence market as a normal internal market issue. "And so ⦋the Commission declared⦌, we accept that there are specific issues within that market, and we will put In arguing that member states had a sense of obligation to respect internal market rules in this particular case, there is an important distinction to be made between member states being coerced into following internal market rules, or voluntarily acknowledging such rules. Even though internal market rules may have entrapped member states, because of a high cost to contravene, they still had to possibility to voluntarily abide to such norms. The member states could have blocked the proposal at any time, but chose not to do so. An example of such threat could be the case law from the ECJ with regards to article 346 TFEU (Blauberger and Weiss 2013) . However, an UK official makes it very clear that this was not a main concern:
It was a former minister and we wanted to do something uncompetitive with
France. And the minister said, "But we will have trouble with the Commission."
And I suggested to him we should test it. Just to see what happened. Because I was pretty sure, I am still pretty sure we would get away with it. Getting away with it sounds slightly wrong. I think their bark is worse than their bite (Interview British official, 20 January 2015) .
In addition, a French official stated that France voluntarily entered into the discussions.
During the informal discussions between the Commission and the French Defence
Ministry, prior to the draft of the Directive, it was clear that France had two choices:
either enforcing the use of 346 TFEU and thereby telling the Commission that defence procurement was none of their business; or "the other option was to accept discussion with the Commission on the basic assumption that there would be at the end a modus vivendi which would limit the scope" (Interview French official, 28 July 2015) . Both these findings highlight that member states were not forced to accept the proposal for a Directive. Member states acknowledged the internal market rules and voluntarily entered the discussions with the Commission. In the words of a Dutch official:
You can ask yourself, is it politically desirable for your country not to comply, The acknowledgement of the internal market rules had consequences for how member states perceived the policy issue: "So I mean, we approached it, and the way it was sold to our ministers essentially, opening up the single market is a good thing. That is why we are in the European Union" (Interview British official, 20 January 2015) .
In the policy process, the internal market rules were considered decisive and could not be disregarded, yet the Netherlands, UK and France still indicate that their initial preference did not change. A British official explains:
I cannot remember exactly what sort of regime they constructed, the focus was primarily on things where no one could put up a hand and say there is a real national security interest involved here. So I think to some extent there was a sense of, the way the Commission presented this is very hard to resist this intellectually as you like. But we are not happy that they should be poking around in this area (Interview British official, 1 May 2015).
Member states officials acknowledge that a "complete and total rejection of the idea of a Directive was perceived as undesirable" (Interview British official, 1 May 2015). In particular, as the Directive was created as an extension of the Public Procurement
Directive (Interview French official, 5 May 2015; French official, 28 July 2015) . Even though member states were not particularly welcoming a role for the Commission, the obligation to internal market rules was seen as undeniable.
I just know that of all the things that worried the UK at the beginning, continued to worry us at the end. So, our position did not change. Obviously, publicly you say yes we are going along with it. And we did. … But our concerns never changed (Interview British official, 19 January 2015) .
To summarize, the use of this second perspective allows us to gain insight into how important it was for member states to adhere to the rules of the internal market in the years that they changed their positions. Member states emphasize that they complied with internal market rules because this is viewed as desirable when being a member of the EU. The perspective as such answers the questions surrounding why these member states accepted the proposal of a Directive based on a sense of obligation to respect community norms. The analysis has in addition uncovered the paradox of the aspiration to respect internal market rules, yet not fully embracing the involvement of the 
Entrapment revisited
At first sight the puzzle of this case study can be answered by using the idea of entrapment. However, there are limitations to this perspective. Previous research has dealt with these shortcomings and has suggested that the theory is not specific enough in explaining underlying mechanisms that can capture or explain why actors voluntarily adhere to a certain norm (Sjursen 2002 shapes the actions and arguments of actors. In contrast to the methodological individualism of a rational choice perspective, the theory acknowledges that "the existence and validity of social norms at the inter-subjective level and the ability to reach mutual understanding are the coordinating mechanisms" (Eriksen and Weigård 1997, p. 221) . One of these is the principle of consistency between what actors say and do (Eriksen et al. 2005, p. 240 ). An expectation of consistency has therefore a normative underpinning, because it's based on a common belief that actors ought to respect this principle.
This paper exposes how member states changed their position, that is, the move from mere reluctance towards the Commission proposals to accepting the Directive. In addition, the analysis points to inconsistencies in the position of member states studied.
Previous to the Directive member states indicated the preference for intergovernmental solutions and the findings of this paper highlight that even after the acceptance of the Directive, such preferences continued to exist. This kind of preference is expressed in word; however, the move and acceptance of a supranational legal framework is a clear action towards more integration in the field of defence and security. And so what we will do, we will go along with this, we will join their discussion groups, and we will participate in the drafting of the Directive, and have our lawyers be very careful that nothing is done which contradicts the ultimate big bazooka of our national security interest. And then when the Directive finally comes into force we will ignore it (Interview British official, 1 May 2015).
Concluding remarks
This article contributes to the growing literature on the influence of the European Commission on the CSDP of the EU. It does so, in particular, by analysing why member states changed their position on the Defence and Security Procurement
Directive. The idea for a Directive was rejected in 2004, but a proposal was accepted in the Council in 2007. In order to tease out why member states allowed for a supranational legal framework in a field so closely attached to their sovereignty, the paper moves beyond current findings by providing new data from the UK, France, Sweden and the Netherlands. Using process tracing, the paper finds that a rational choice perspective, often used to explain European integration, fails to account for the acceptance of a Directive. The cost-benefit calculations, based on economic benefits, were not significantly changed during this period of time to explain the outcome and acceptance. After the first introduction of an idea for a Directive in 2004, however, member states' documents highlight the acceptance and discovery of the Defence Directive belonging within the Internal Market policy. By using an understanding of entrapment, which allows for an analytical distinction between interest and norms, the paper finds that the member states studied found it a high cost not to comply with rules existent in the internal market policy. These findings suggest that contravening previously made commitments regarding the internal market of the EU was expected to lead to a loss of credibility as a member of the European community.
The empirical implications of these findings are twofold. On the one hand the acceptance of the proposal for a Defence Directive suggests that member states have possibly come to view the norms existent within the Union more important than the norm of sovereignty. These findings suggest that even in the field of defence and security, member states wish to adhere to these norms, as, for example, internal market rules. In addition, the findings of this paper support studies that have contested our knowledge about the role of the Commission in the defence and security policy, demonstrating that the acceptance of the Directive clearly marks the beginning of the Commission gaining foothold in this policy field.
Theoretically, the findings in this case study resolve why member states changed their position, but also call for the need for alternative explanations that are not based on a rational calculation only. The paper introduces the shortcomings of the use of entrapment and suggests that a way to solve the problems posed by this understanding can be resolved by a communicative perspective. Therefore, the study indicates that it is important to develop and make use of theoretical tools that can explain why integration in this field happened, is possible, or why this particular policy is delegated to the Commission. Further research should explore the continual involvement of the Commission in this field to reveal the extent to which the practice in the field of defence procurement has changed.
